An Experimental Test of Ambient-Based Mechanisms for Nonpoint Source Pollution Control by Vossler, Christian A. et al.
 An Experimental Test of Ambient-Based Mechanisms for 
Nonpoint Source Pollution Control 
 
 
by 
 
 
Christian A. Vossler, Gregory L. Poe, 
William D. Schulze and Kathleen Segerson 
ERE 2002-01 
WP 2002-35 
 It is the Policy of Cornell University actively to support equality of educational 
and employment opportunity.  No person shall be denied admission to any 
educational program or activity or be denied employment on the basis of any 
legally prohibited discrimination involving, but not limited to, such factors as 
race, color, creed, religion, national or ethnic origin, sex, age or handicap.  
The University is committed to the maintenance of affirmative action 
programs which will assure the continuation of such equality of opportunity. 
 1 
 
 
An Experimental Test of Ambient-Based Mechanisms 
for Nonpoint Source Pollution Control 
 
 
Christian A. Vossler* 
Department of Applied Economics and Management,  
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY  14853-7801  
 
Gregory L. Poe 
Department of Applied Economics and Management,  
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY  14853-7801 
 
William D. Schulze 
Department of Applied Economics and Management,  
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY  14853-7801 
 
Kathleen Segerson 
Department of Economics, 
University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT  06269-1063 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Please direct correspondence to Christian A. Vossler, Department of Applied Economics and 
Management, 157 Warren Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853-7801. E-mail: 
cav22@cornell.edu. Telephone: 607-255-2085. Fax: 607-255-9984. We thank Jeremy Clark, 
Kent Messer, Kerry Smith, and participants at the Second World Congress and Camp Resources 
meetings in 2002. Research partially supported by USDA Regional Project W-133 and the 
Kenneth L. Robinson Endowment. 
 2 
Abstract: 
 
 This paper presents an experimental investigation of the three ambient-based mechanisms 
proposed by Segerson [J. Environ. Econom. Management 15, 87-98 (1988)] for controlling 
emissions from a group of nonpoint source polluters: a marginal tax/subsidy, a fixed penalty, and 
a mechanism that combines the two. To parallel likely conditions in a small watershed, in half of 
the experiment sessions we allow the group of polluters to engage in costless, non-binding 
discussion (cheap talk). In sessions without discussion, we find that the tax/subsidy instrument 
achieves the pollution target, while the fixed penalty and combined mechanisms do not. 
However, the tax/subsidy does not induce compliance at the individual level. Allowing 
discussion renders the tax/subsidy ineffective by encouraging gross overcompliance, but notably 
increases the usefulness of the fixed penalty and combined mechanisms. Differences in outcomes 
are likely attributable to the dissimilar marginal incentives under the three mechanisms.             
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I. Introduction 
 
 There is a growing economics literature on incentive-based approaches for controlling 
agricultural and other nonpoint source pollution. Since individual firm emissions are 
prohibitively expensive to observe, proposed economic solutions base regulation on input use, 
abatement practices, emissions proxies, or ambient pollution levels (for a recent review, see 
Shortle and Horan 2001). Much of the focus in recent years has been on ambient-based 
instruments, which were first proposed by Segerson (1988) and draw upon the principal-agent 
literature (e.g., Holmström 1982). Under Segerson’s general incentive scheme, a group of 
polluters pays penalties if ambient pollution at a common receptor point is above a pollution 
target or receives subsidies if pollution is below the target. The liability of each polluter depends 
on the abatement efforts of all polluters, not just her own, as well as stochastic environmental 
interactions. Segerson develops three policy instruments: (1) a tax/subsidy where all firms pay 
(receive) a tax (subsidy) for each unit of pollution above (below) the pollution target; (2) a fixed 
penalty imposed on all firms whenever the ambient concentration exceeds the target; and (3) a 
tax/subsidy combined with a fixed penalty.     
 In a recent experimental study, Spraggon (2002) finds that the tax/subsidy instrument is 
effective in achieving the pollution target but the fixed penalty is not. However, the tax/subsidy 
approach does not induce compliance at the individual firm level, and can hence be viewed as 
inequitable. Cochard, Willinger, and Xepapadeas (2002) experimentally test these two 
instruments as well, but find that the fixed penalty induces compliance while the tax/subsidy 
results in gross overcompliance. Given their design parameters, however, these results are not 
surprising. The fixed penalty they employ is eight times greater than necessary to induce 
compliance theoretically, and firms have an overwhelming incentive to meet the pollution target, 
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as earnings are negative otherwise. Pollution is consistently below the target in their tax/subsidy 
experiment, and is indicative of tacit collusion among firms, since group profit increases from 
subsidy payments outweigh losses in net revenue from decreased sales in the experiment. 
Although Spraggon identifies the theoretical possibility of collusion, he does not observe such an 
outcome in his experiments. The difference in tax/subsidy experiment outcomes may be 
attributable to the smaller group sizes (four versus six) used by Cochard, Willinger, and 
Xepapadeas.  
 This paper presents an experimental investigation of all three ambient-based mechanisms 
proposed by Segerson. The other studies do not test the instrument that combines the tax/subsidy 
and fixed penalty, but it is important to consider. Except in the case of a linear damage function, 
the regulator needs the combined approach to achieve long run efficiency and to ensure the 
optimal entry and exit of firms in a watershed. Further, we test the three policy instruments with 
and without allowing experiment participants to engage in “cheap talk” discussion. Originating 
in the game theory literature (see Farrell 1987), cheap talk refers to costless, nonbinding 
communication between players made prior to actual commitments. In the cheap talk 
experiments, the group of polluters can discuss abatement strategies in response to the ambient 
mechanism imposed on them but cannot make binding agreements. The cheap talk experiments 
are an important contribution to the literature as they mimic a real-world situation where the 
regulator imposes a policy instrument on a small number of firms in a watershed. Weersink et al. 
(1998) suggest that ambient taxes may be best suited for managing pollution problems in small 
watersheds. In this situation, firms facing potentially large tax payments have the incentive to 
discuss compliance strategies, and presumably incur negligible transaction costs in doing so. The 
regulator, and associated extension or outreach agencies, may also wish to bring firms together to 
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discuss the implications and details of a new, unfamiliar policy action. Although Segerson does 
not consider the possibility of discussion among firms, some researchers imply that such 
discussion may render the tax/subsidy approach ineffective (Hansen 1998; Spraggon). In 
particular, overabatement can result in subsidies that are much higher than the increase in 
abatement costs. The economics laboratory provides a venue from which to explore behavioral 
interactions between competitors that are not considered in theoretical models. 
 Our experimental design differs noticeably from other experimental studies in this area. 
First, similar to Plott’s (1983) seminal experimental study on the efficiency of tax and trade 
externality mechanisms, participants in our study compete to sell their product in a two-sided 
auction market. Therefore, our design introduces uncertainty in the production outcome and 
revenue from sales. Chambers and Quiggin (1996) stress that production uncertainty can 
significantly affect nonpoint pollution levels and should not be ignored.  In the other studies, 
participants choose a decision number analogous to a production decision and calculate revenue 
through a deterministic quadratic payoff function. Second, we introduce context in the sense that 
we tell participants that they are (hypothetically) operating a firm, are located along a water 
resource near other firms, and jointly cause pollution through their production, which in turn 
causes societal damages. While the introduction of context is not usual protocol, these design 
elements are desirable for establishing a baseline for a future effort of testing policy mechanisms 
with real farmers and for using the experiment as a teaching tool. Third, participants in each 
experimental session go through trading periods without any regulatory intervention before 
facing a pollution control mechanism. This sequence of events parallels a real-world policy 
situation, establishes that pollution is excessive without policy intervention, and serves as a 
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baseline for assessing the effectiveness of the incentive mechanisms. In other studies, 
participants either face a policy mechanism or do not.           
Our motivation for using laboratory experiments to test nonpoint pollution mechanisms is 
simple: there are no real world data on how firms respond to the incentives underlying these 
mechanisms (Shortle and Horan), especially in areas that would involve non-compliance (Alm, 
McClelland, and Schulze 1992, 1999). At a minimum, appropriately designed experiments reveal 
whether people identify and respond to incentives in a way consistent with economic theory.  If 
laboratory subjects fail to respond in a theoretically predicted manner, then it is widely accepted 
that there is little hope of success for the theory in a real world setting. Experiments may also 
provide insight on the appropriateness of the assumptions underlying theoretical models and, 
given observed behavior in the laboratory, offer suggestions on modifying policies to avoid 
potential problems in the field.    
 The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section briefly outlines the Segerson 
ambient-based mechanisms. Section III describes our experimental design and data. Section IV 
presents experiment results and hypothesis tests. In the final section, we summarize our findings 
and discuss their implications for nonpoint pollution policy and research. 
 
II. Overview of Ambient-based Mechanisms 
Segerson’s work shifted the focus from pollution control mechanisms that require 
monitoring the decisions of individual firms to mechanisms that require monitoring ambient 
pollutant concentrations. As a result, the regulator’s large informational burden is reduced. The 
regulator needs to obtain some knowledge concerning the fate and transport of pollutants (as 
would be the case for any efficiency regulation), the value of marginal damages at the desired 
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pollution target, and individual emission and abatement cost functions. In the special case of a 
linear damages function, knowledge of each firm’s emission and abatement cost function is 
unnecessary.    
Using Segerson’s original notation, let x(a,e) be the ambient concentration of a single 
pollutant at a common receptor point, where a is a vector containing each firm’s abatement level 
and e is a random variable. The random variable takes into account uncertain and stochastic 
environmental factors (e.g., rainfall and water currents) that affect the relationship between firm 
emissions and ambient levels. Let D(a,e) be the damages of pollution function and F( a,x ) be the 
probability that the ambient pollution level is less than a pollution target, denoted as x .1 Firms, 
indexed by i, are risk-neutral and have (possibly) different emission and abatement cost 
functions. Tax liabilities are determined as follows: 
 If x > x , then each firm makes a payment equal to ti(x – x ) + ki    
 If x ≥ x, then each firm receives a payment equal to ti( x – x) 
Each polluter chooses the socially optimal level of abatement in response to ti, a marginal 
tax/subsidy, and ki, a fixed penalty, chosen by the regulator in any of the following ways: 
(a) ki = 0 and ti = E[D'•∂x/∂ai]/E[∂x/∂ai], 
(b) ti = 0 and ki = –E[D'•∂x/∂ai]/E[∂F/∂ai], 
or 
(c) ti is arbitrary and ki = (–E[D'•∂x/∂ai] + tiE[∂x/∂ai])/(∂F/∂ai), 
where E is the expectations operator and derivatives are evaluated at the optimum. Hereafter in 
the paper, we refer to (a) as the tax/subsidy, (b) as the fixed penalty, and (c) as the combined 
approach. Regardless of instrument choice, pollution is a public bad and all polluters benefit 
                                                 
1 Segerson defines a benefit function instead of a damage function, but we use the notion of pollution damages in the 
experiments. 
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from an individual firm’s abatement efforts. If the ambient level is greater than the pollution 
target, each firm pays a tax and/or a penalty regardless of whether its individual abatement 
efforts are optimal.  
In the case of a linear damage function (or a function that is approximately linear in the 
vicinity of the optimum) and a pure tax/subsidy scheme, the tax/subsidy rate is equal to marginal 
damages and the regulator needs to know what marginal damages are at the pollution target 
only.2 In this case, when ambient levels are one unit higher than the target, each firm pays a tax 
equal to marginal damages and the total tax revenue is the number of firms multiplied by the tax 
rate. That is, the mechanism requires “each polluter to incur the marginal damage associated 
with the targeted level of pollution, with the end result being a multiple of damage costs 
collected (distributed) when taxes (subsidies) are employed” (Herriges, Govindasamy, and 
Shogren 1994, p. 266).3  
 With the fixed penalty mechanism, liabilities are discontinuous at a threshold level akin 
to provision points in public goods funding mechanisms (Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe 1999). As 
long as ambient levels remain above x a fixed penalty is imposed on all firms. If ambient levels 
are at or below x , no penalty is assessed. 
 The combined approach provides a multitude of possible t and k combinations. While the 
magnitude of opportunities may appear daunting, this feature is perceived to be an advantage of 
the mechanism. It is well known that the effect of tax and subsidy schemes on profitability can 
influence entry/exit decisions of firms from an industry. Variable k values allow the regulator 
                                                 
2 In the more general case of a nonlinear damage function, Hansen (1998) and Horan, Shortle, and Abler (1998) 
show that a tax scheme based on observed total damages rather than the ambient concentration allows the regulator 
to implement a uniform policy with only knowledge of the damage function in hand. 
3 Several authors have raised concerns that the “resulting monetary transactions and associated costs would be 
substantial” (Horan, Shortle, and Abler 1998, p. 193). Recognizing this, attention has turned to the budget-balancing 
implications of the tax/subsidy mechanism (e.g., Xepapadeas 1991; Herriges, Govindasamy, and Shogren; Horan, 
Shortle, and Abler). 
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some flexibility in using lump sum transfers for controlling incentives for firm entry and exit, 
thus engendering the possibility of long-run as well as short-run efficiency. 
 
III. Experimental Procedures and Design 
 In the spring and summer of 2002, we conducted experiments with 144 Cornell 
University undergraduate student participants recruited from classes in the Department of 
Applied Economics and Management and the Department of Economics. All participants had at 
least an introductory understanding of microeconomic theory and approximately 80% had prior 
experience in economics experiments. Experiments took place in the Laboratory for 
Experimental Economics and Decision Research (LEEDR) using GreenWeb, an Internet-based 
computer platform developed at Cornell.4  
Experiment sessions lasted approximately an hour and one half and subjects earned 
between $20 and $60, paid in cash immediately after the experiment. After subjects read 
instructions, the lead author gave a PowerPoint presentation outlining the experiment and 
answered any questions.5 After one trading period was completed, subjects had a final 
opportunity to ask questions. This procedure ensured that subjects understood how the market 
worked and how to interpret the market results displayed by the computer. The computer made 
all relevant calculations. There were no practice periods and the experiment consisted of thirty 
independent trading periods. 
 In each experimental session, six participants (indexed by i = 1,…,6) play the role of 
identical, independent firms that can each produce up to five units of a good during each of the 
thirty trading periods. Total production costs for the firm, ci(qi), are increasing in the quantity 
                                                 
4 The current web address is www.pserc.cornell.edu/greenweb/1.2/greenweb.html. 
5 PowerPoint files are available upon request. We used this presentation format to help facilitate close replication of 
experiments. 
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sold, qi, and at an increasing rate. Specifically, total costs are $50, $200, $500, $1000, and $1800 
for qi = 1,…,5. The number of units sold (produced) in a given period and the price paid for units 
are determined through a uniform price sealed-bid/offer auction.6 Each participant submits five 
price offers, one corresponding to each unit they can produce. The participant’s offer prices can 
be the same for each unit or differ. The auction ranks all (thirty) offers from lowest to highest. 
On the demand side, computer agents represent consumers that submit bids equal to their 
marginal benefits.7 Specifically, the highest bid is equal to $1,700 and each subsequent bid is $50 
less than the previous one. The auction ranks bids from highest to lowest. The average price of 
the last accepted bid and offer (where the bid and offer arrays intersect) determines the market-
clearing price, p. This clearing price is paid to all accepted offers. After each trading period, the 
computer displays all profit calculations relevant for the individual firm, total group output, and 
ambient pollution. The production costs and demand-side bids do not change during the course 
of the experiment. Participants know nothing about buyers except that they are experienced in 
this type of auction and can potentially buy all units offered.    
 Each unit sold results in one unit of ambient pollution on average. Specifically, the 
pollution level is equal to the total output from the group, Q, plus a random term, e, distributed 
uniformly on the interval [-1, 1].8 A firm reduces its emissions (abates) by producing less.9 Each 
unit of output results in expected pollution damages to society of $500, such that 
                                                 
6 This is also known as a clearinghouse auction or single price auction. The New York Stock Exchange begins each 
trading day with this auction. In general, this auction captures approximately 90% of available economic surplus in 
the absence of an externality (Kagel and Roth 1995). The auction fares better than this in our application since the 
only buyers in the market are computer agents programmed to submit bids equal to their maximum willingness to 
pay. 
7 Although the seminal experimental paper on pollution control mechanisms (Plott 1983) used a double auction, we 
opted to have human participants on supply side of the market only, as we are specifically interested in firm 
behavior. In addition, this experiment is somewhat complex and having demand-side subjects adds unnecessary 
complication.   
8 When output is zero, e is constrained to be zero. 
9 Output reduction is just one way to reduce pollution. Alternatively, we could have firms choose from a set of 
abatement technologies, as in the marketable permit experiments of Ben-David et al. (1999). However, we abstract 
in order to simplify the setting. Ben-David et al. simplified their experiments by fixing the output price.   
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E[D(Q,e)]=$500Q. Figure 1 presents the marginal benefit, private marginal cost, and social 
marginal cost arrays for this experiment. The competitive solution (marginal benefit = private 
marginal cost) is Q = 24 and the socially optimal solution (marginal benefit = social marginal 
cost) is Q = 18, a reduction in pollution of 25%.10 Since all firms are identical, an equitable 
distribution of profits has each firm selling four units in the competitive outcome and three units 
in the optimal outcome.   
 There are two parts to the experiment. The first part consists of ten trading periods with 
no pollution control mechanism and the second consists of twenty periods with the mechanism. 
The two parts of the experiment reflect a real-world sequence of events. After each non-
mechanism period, participants observe the pollution level and the social damages from pollution 
but these measures do not directly affect profits in any way. The second experiment part is 
identical to the first, except for the addition of a policy mechanism. Participants receive 
information detailing the treatment-specific mechanism only after completing the first ten trading 
periods. We impose one of three possible mechanisms on each group:  
(a2) tax/subsidy: k = 0 and t = $500, 
(b2) fixed penalty: t = 0 and k = $1000, 
or 
(c2) combined approach: t = $250 and k = $500, 
where the parameters for the policies are calculated using equations (a), (b), and (c) in Section II, 
and the pollution target, x , is set to the socially optimal level of 18 units.11 Since marginal 
damages are equal to $500/unit (at the pollution target and otherwise), the optimal tax/subsidy 
rate is $500/unit. That is, whenever pollution is above (below) 18 units each firm pays a tax 
                                                 
10  Spraggon’s and Cochard, Willinger, and Xepapadeas’ experiments involve a 75 % reduction and a 28% 
reduction, respectively.  
11 We omit subscripts since the tax/subsidy and fixed penalty amounts are the same for homogenous firms. 
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(receives a subsidy) of $500 for each unit of pollution above (below) 18. Since there is, on 
average, a one-to-one relationship between pollution and abatement, E[∂x/∂a] = –1. Given the 
error distribution, deviating from the optimum by one unit changes the probability of paying the 
penalty from 0.5 to 1.0; hence, E[∂F/∂a] = 0.5.12  It follows that the fixed penalty is $1,000 and 
imposed whenever pollution exceeds 18 units. For the combined approach, the marginal 
tax/subsidy rate is arbitrarily set to $250, resulting in an optimal fixed penalty of $500. Given our 
design parameters, the only Nash equilibrium in each mechanism treatment occurs when each 
firm chooses the socially optimal level of abatement (production). However, for the tax/subsidy 
and combined mechanism treatments, the symmetric group outcome that maximizes profits is 
when output is zero. Even though firms forego all profits from sales, the magnitude of subsidy 
payments offsets this. The incentive to collude and overabate is due to the non-budget balancing 
characteristic of the mechanism (Hansen 1998). 
 For each no-mechanism period, profits for the firm are: 
  500)()( +−= iiiii qcpqqπ               (1) 
where p and qi are determined in the market. The extra $500 in per period profits reflects 
government subsidies or off-farm income. This is included to decrease the variance in subject 
earnings and to decrease the likelihood of negative earnings. Profits under the three mechanisms 
are:  
  )(*500]500)([)( xxqcpqq iiiii −−+−=π           (2a) 
  Jqcpqq iiiii 1000]500)([)( −+−=π                 (2b) 
  Jxxqcpqq iiiii 500)(*250]500)([)( −−−+−=π               (2c) 
                                                 
12 We randomly drew a set of thirty error terms from the specified distribution before the experiments and used the 
same set of errors in each session. The probability of a positive error term for any mechanism-imposed period is 
indeed 0.5. 
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where J = 1 if x > x and equals 0 otherwise. Directly following the experiment, participants 
receive cash payments equal to the profits across all periods multiplied by the factor $1 US / 
$2,000 EXP.13   
 We conducted eight sessions each of the tax/subsidy, fixed penalty, and combined 
approach.  In four of the eight sessions for each mechanism, we allowed participants to engage in 
cheap talk. In the relevant sessions, cheap talk took place before the first mechanism round 
(period 11) and before the eleventh mechanism round (period 21) only. The only discussion 
guidelines were that participants could not threaten each other or arrange for any side payments. 
There was no communication of any kind between participants in sessions without cheap talk. 
We include the general set of instructions for all treatments as Appendix A and include the 
supplemental instructions for the tax/subsidy treatment with cheap talk as Appendix B. 
Instructions include (color) screen shots that subjects encounter during the experiments. 
Supplemental instructions are similar for other treatments and available upon request.  
 
IV. Results 
Table 1 presents the average group output for non-mechanism and mechanism periods, as 
well as efficiency calculations for all experiment sessions. Figure 2 presents a time series of the 
average group output by treatment and Figure 3 presents the group output for all sessions. 
Consistent with Spraggon, we calculate an efficiency measure defined as the percentage of 
available economic surplus (ES) captured over and above the surplus in the (theoretical) 
perfectly competitive outcome: 
                                                 
13 In lieu of extremely high payouts observed for the first session of the tax/subsidy treatment with cheap talk, the 
exchange rate is $1 US / $3,500 EXP for the remaining sessions of this treatment.  
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  Efficiency = %100×−
−
ecompetitivoptimal
ecompetitivobserved
ESES
ESES
                       (3)  
Efficiency equals 100% when the group output is 18 units and each firm produces three units. 
Efficiency equals 0% when the group output is 24 units and each firm produces four units. 
Deviations from these two efficiency levels occur when output is reduced or increased and/or 
higher cost units are sold instead of lower cost units. Efficiency can be negative if the surplus 
captured is less than that under perfectly competitive conditions. Tax or subsidy payments are 
not included when calculating efficiencies.  
In this section, we first analyze behavior in the absence of regulatory intervention. 
Second, we test whether the observed outcome under the various mechanisms is equal to the 
theoretical prediction. Third, we test whether group output is different across mechanisms. To 
test our hypotheses, we employ one and two-sample t-tests, where the average outcome across 
trading periods in a session is treated as one independent observation (i.e., n=4 for each 
mechanism treatment). To remove the trends in the data due to learning effects, the first five non-
mechanism and the first ten mechanism periods are not included in hypothesis tests. Results are 
robust to other, arbitrary groupings of outcomes. The results of our tests coincide with the basic 
intuition gleaned from reviewing the data. We employ five-percent significance levels for all 
tests. 
 
A. Non-Mechanism Outcomes 
 Before imposing the mechanism, all subject groups consistently fail to reach the 
theoretically competitive solution of 24 units. The slight inefficiencies observed are not 
unexpected, as the incentive exists for sellers in this multi-unit auction to try to manipulate price 
with their higher cost units. However, the uniform price auction mechanism is a commonly used 
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alternative to the highly efficient double-auction, which performs slightly better on efficiency 
grounds. More importantly, the use of the uniform price auction allows us to concentrate solely 
on supply-side behavior.   
Across all sessions, the average group output for all non-mechanism periods is 22.2 units 
and the average for Period 10 is 22.8 units. Figure 2 reveals a slight upward time trend for all 
treatments, suggesting some sort of “invisible-hand” type market learning over time. One-sample 
t-tests reject the hypothesis of equality between the observed outcome and the perfectly 
competitive outcome for each treatment. We do not reject these same hypotheses using outcomes 
from Period 10 only, except for the combined approach with cheap talk treatment. As such, 
output is roughly at the perfectly competitive level when we impose the mechanism and certainly 
above socially optimal levels. 
 
B. Mechanism Outcomes without Cheap Talk     
In the treatments where no discussion takes place among subjects, the results of the three 
mechanisms are mixed. Output in all treatments declines during the initial mechanism periods, 
with only the output in the fixed penalty sessions returning to near-competitive levels. The latter 
result is consistent with behavior in voluntary contributions public good experiments where, in 
the absence of discussion, some players initially contribute to the public good but gradually 
reduce their contributions towards zero upon observing that overall contributions are suboptimal 
(Isaac and Walker 1988). The tax/subsidy fares well in achieving the optimal output level and 
averages 18.35 units over the last 10 trading periods. This output is not statistically different 
from the theoretical optimum (p = 0.280). Over the same set of periods, the fixed penalty 
treatment averages 21.55 units and the combined approach averages 19.35 units. The fixed 
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penalty outcome is statistically different from the optimum (p = 0.000) and different from the 
other two mechanisms. The combined approach output is not statistically different from the 
theoretically predicted outcome, although only marginally so (p=0.070). The overall results make 
sense, as the tax/subsidy provides the greatest incentives at the margin over all output levels. 
Given the distribution of the error term, the fixed penalty only provides incentives at the margin 
when output is close to the optimum. From the perspective of a firm, there is no guarantee that 
reducing output leads to higher earnings. Our results for the tax/subsidy and fixed penalty 
treatments are consistent with the findings of Spraggon.   
 Similar to the findings of Spraggon, we do not observe compliance at the individual level 
for the tax/subsidy treatment. That is, although average output is near the optimum, each firm is 
not consistently selling three units. Higher cost units are sold, thus reducing the efficiency 
measure from 100%. Average efficiency is only 56.2% and very similar to the efficiency of the 
combined approach (52.0%). It became evident through debriefing sessions that one or two 
subjects in each session intentionally withdrew too many units from the auction – by submitting 
extremely high offer prices – in order to safeguard against paying relatively high taxes. This 
contrasts Segerson’s theoretical assumption that firms are risk-neutral. Those subjects that sold 
too many units knew that they would earn more money by selling less, but cited a desire to earn 
more money than their competitors (and hence did not play their dominant strategy). Subjects 
who sold too many units commonly said they would have sold less if output exceeded the target 
level, as their profits would have sufficiently decreased. 
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C. Mechanism Outcomes with Cheap Talk  
Communication among firms in a market has a pronounced impact on the effectiveness 
of the mechanisms. For each mechanism, output in cheap talk sessions is significantly lower than 
in sessions without cheap talk (tax/subsidy: p=0.030; fixed penalty: p=0.000; combined: 
p=0.018). In all sessions of the treatment with the tax/subsidy and cheap talk, participants 
realized that the group maximizes profits when output is zero. This collusive outcome is also the 
most profitable in the Spraggon and Cochard, Willinger, and Xepapadeas experimental studies of 
this type. A firm has the incentive to deviate from the zero output strategy if it assumes that no 
one else will deviate. However, once someone deviated in a session, an unraveling process 
apparently took place where more units were sold in each subsequent period. This 
“environmental shirking” is similar to the free-riding behavior observed in voluntary 
contributions experiments for public goods (e.g., Isaac and Walker). Only one of four groups was 
successful in implementing and sustaining the profit maximizing group strategy for all periods. 
The other three groups did not successfully implement this strategy.  At the same time, group 
output never exceeded 17 units, indicating that subjects were substantially risk averse relative to 
the discontinuous fixed penalty. Overall, group output is marginally statistically different from 
the optimum (p=0.064). The average output over the last 10 periods is only 6.88, but there is a 
considerable variance in this measure. We note that participants in each tax/subsidy session were 
aware of the zero output collusive strategy.    
The results for the fixed penalty are remarkably consistent across sessions. During the 
first discussion in all four sessions, subjects agreed on a group output of 17 units. During second-
round discussions, subjects reiterated this strategy. To help ensure its success, subjects in all 
sessions devised a plan where, in each period, five people sold three units and one person sold 
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two. Participants took turns selling only two based on an assigned rotation. Given the error 
distribution of pollution, a group outcome of 17 just ensures no penalty will occur and is the 
strategy that maximizes group profits. Over the last 10 periods, output in all sessions is 
statistically different from the optimum (p = 0.004) and averages 17.05. 
The combined approach is the most effective in terms of achieving proximity to the 
pollution target. The average output over the last ten periods, 17.25 units, is not statistically 
different from the target (p = 0.299). As in the tax/subsidy treatment, maximum group earnings 
occur when group output is zero. Two groups discussed this strategy, but subjects were not 
convinced that the strategy maximized profits, and noted that market price increased as output 
decreased. This suggests that the mixed approach made the most profitable solution less 
transparent. Instead, participants in these two groups attempted to sell two units each. In the 
remaining two sessions, subjects agreed to sell three units each so that expected tax payments 
were zero. It is somewhat surprising that no group implemented the strategy used in the fixed 
penalty sessions to avoid paying taxes (and associated penalty) altogether. Although group 
earnings are higher with this strategy than when everyone sells three units, at the firm level the 
difference between earnings from selling the third unit (given everyone else sells three units) and 
the change in tax payments is subtle (around $25 in experimental dollars). Efficiency in this 
treatment is the highest at 75.2%, followed closely by the fixed penalty mechanism (72.1%).  
 
V. Concluding Remarks and Directions for Future Research 
This study presents experimental tests of the three ambient-based mechanisms for 
controlling nonpoint pollution proposed by Segerson: the marginal tax/subsidy, a fixed penalty 
imposed whenever the ambient concentration exceeds the target, and an approach that combines 
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a marginal tax/subsidy with a fixed penalty (“combined approach”). The taxes firms pay or 
subsidies firms receive coincide with deviations between the observed ambient pollution level 
and a pollution target, as well as the stochastic nature of biological resources. As such, the 
financial outcome of the policy depends on the combined behavior of all firms. Our study 
extends the existing experimental literature by testing the combined approach, needed to achieve 
long-run efficiency in the presence of a nonlinear damage function, and by allowing respondents 
to engage in non-binding discussion. Allowing group discussion reflects a real-world situation 
where a small number of firms in a watershed have incentives to discuss strategies in order to 
avoid (potentially) large financial losses. 
When firms cannot discuss abatement strategies, the tax/subsidy performs the best and 
ambient pollution levels are not statistically different from the specified pollution target. The 
fixed penalty mechanism performs poorly, probably because individual firms do not have 
incentives at the margin to change their decision when ambient pollution is far from optimal. The 
performance of the combined approach lies between the other two.  
When discussion occurs between subjects, which we argue is the most likely case if such 
policies are implemented on a watershed-by watershed basis, average output is statistically 
below the pollution target in the tax/subsidy and fixed penalty treatments. In the tax/subsidy 
treatment, subjects easily identified that the group would maximize earnings by limiting 
production to zero: indeed, on average output was some 50% below optimal. In the fixed penalty 
treatment, subjects are successful in implementing a strategy where output is exactly one unit 
below the target. Given the random variation in ambient pollution, the group thus manages to 
avoid the penalty in all periods. The combined approach yields output that is not statistically 
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different from the target pollution level. The fixed penalty and combined approaches work well 
in terms of economic efficiency and equity of earnings among firms.    
Two important and related issues arise from this research. The first issue is how large the 
tax/subsidy rate and/or the fixed penalty are likely to be in relation to earnings from output sales. 
A second issue is how to modify the mechanisms in order to avoid large subsidy payments, and 
similarly to prevent firms from overcompliance in the presence of potentially large fines for 
noncompliance and random environmental factors. The tax/subsidy rate and/or fixed penalty 
depend largely upon societal damages, which are determined exogenously to polluters. As such, 
the tax/subsidy rate and/or fixed penalty are likely to be very watershed specific. Unfortunately, 
there is little information available on the damage functions of polluters in small watersheds. It is 
plausible that damage-income disparities may be large or small and induce different types of 
behavior in either circumstance.  
When polluters are likely to discuss strategies with one another, it is especially important 
to investigate modifications of the tax/subsidy and combined mechanisms under conditions 
where a group of regulated firms has the incentive to collude and underabate to collect large 
subsidy payments. This incentive is a result of the non-budget balancing property of the 
mechanisms. In particular, firms collectively have the incentive to overabate when the marginal 
revenue from group output sales is less than the tax/subsidy rate multiplied by the number of 
firms. As evident from our experimental results, one way to reduce this incentive is by varying 
the tax/subsidy and fixed penalty rate within a combined approach. For both the tax/subsidy and 
combined approaches, one can set a pollution cut-off level below which the tax/subsidy rate is 
zero. Hansen (1998) shows theoretically, in the case where the regulator imposes a nonlinear tax 
equal to total damages, that such a scheme can be developed that prevents polluters from forming 
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a coalition and reducing pollution to suboptimal levels. With a fixed penalty mechanism, the 
regulator may want to account for some of the random environmental factors that serve to 
increase ambient pollution (e.g., weather) and announce that she will not impose a penalty under 
the more extreme sets of circumstances. Such an approach does not induce optimality, but may 
prevent firms from overly excessive abatement in the presence of potentially large government 
fines. In a similar vein, Horan, Shortle, Abler design a state-dependent ambient mechanism with 
a tax rate that is determined after the realization of the values of all random variables.   
The current experimental research on ambient-based pollution control instruments is an 
important and informative step in the research on nonpoint source pollution mechanisms. We 
maintain that our research provides a baseline for extending emerging theoretical analysis on this 
subject (e.g., Xepapadeas; Chambers and Quiggin; Horan, Shortle, and Abler; Hansen 2002) on 
many levels. First, it may be desirable to impose design elements that more accurately reflect a 
firm’s decision-making environment. For instance, we can implement emissions functions that 
are heterogeneous across firms and have firms jointly choose their output level and abatement 
effort or we can alter firm abatement-ambient pollution relationships. Second, our experimental 
results may be sensitive to the chosen design parameters and we can modify the damage function 
and the random variability of ambient pollution as a stress test. Third, the behavior of 
undergraduate economics students may differ from decision makers in agriculture. Once a 
mechanism passes muster in the academic laboratory, it remains likely that we can learn much by 
having relevant decision makers as experiment participants and discussing potential policy 
mechanisms with them.  
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Table 1. Summary of Experimental Results: Group Output and Efficiency  
 
 No Mechanism 
 (Periods 1-10)a 
Mechanism 
 (Periods 11-30)b 
 Output Efficiency (%) Output Efficiency (%) 
Tax/Subsidy 
Session 1 21.0 39.7 18.7 47.2 
Session 2 22.9 17.4 19.2 53.2 
Session 3 21.4 41.5 18.7 48.6 
Session 4 22.9 22.3 18.2 75.6 
Average 22.1 30.2 18.7 56.2 
Tax/Subsidy with Cheap Talkc 
Session 1 22.0 33.3 13.1           -42.6 
Session 2 21.1 36.4 14.7 29.5 
Session 3 23.2 13.8 8.7 -221.2 
Session 4 21.1 45.6 0.0 -461.5 
Average 21.9 32.3 9.1 -174.0 
Fixed Penalty 
Session 1 20.8 35.6 21.6 46.8 
Session 2 22.8 20.3 21.2 44.6 
Session 3 22.5 29.5 21.3 34.2 
Session 4 22.6 11.8 21.0 40.4 
Average 22.2 24.3 21.3 41.5 
Fixed Penalty with Cheap Talkc 
Session 1 21.9 41.8 18.6 53.7 
Session 2 22.1 7.4 17.3 84.2 
Session 3 23.0 15.6 17.1 65.3 
Session 4 22.9 18.5 17.3 85.1 
Average 22.5 20.8 17.6 72.1 
Combined Approach 
Session 1 22.9 22.6 20.1 65.9 
Session 2 22.1 33.3 19.7 61.9 
Session 3 21.9 36.4 18.1 13.8 
Session 4 22.2 17.4 20.4 66.4 
Average 22.3 27.4 19.5 52.0 
Combined Approach with Cheap Talkc 
Session 1 23.0 14.9 18.4 80.1 
Session 2 22.7 23.3 18.5 78.2 
Session 3 21.8 24.1 17.0 63.5 
Session 4 22.0 39.0 18.0 80.9 
Average 22.4 25.3 18.0 75.7 
a Theoretical prediction is an output of 24 units and efficiency of 0%. 
 b Theoretical prediction is an output of 18 units and efficiency of 100%. 
 c Informal group discussion allowed before periods 11 and 21. 
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Table 2. Hypothesis Test Results 
 
Hypothesis Test Type t-test statistic 
 (p-value) 
Sessions without Cheap Talk 
Outputtax/subsidy = 18 One sample    1.32     (0.280) 
Outputfixed penalty = 18 One sample  16.01     (0.000) 
Outputcombined approach = 18 One sample    2.77     (0.070) 
Outputtax/subsidy = Outputfixed penalty two sample, unequal variances -10.97     (0.000) 
Outputtax/subsidy = Outputcombined approach two sample, unequal variances   -1.86     (0.136) 
Outputfixed penalty = Outputcombined approach two sample, unequal variances    4.23     (0.013) 
Sessions with Cheap Talk 
Outputtax/subsidy = 18 One sample  -2.86      (0.064) 
Outputfixed penalty = 18 One sample  -7.98      (0.004) 
Outputcombined approach = 18 One sample  -1.25      (0.299) 
Outputtax/subsidy = Outputfixed penalty two sample, unequal variances  -2.62      (0.072) 
Outputtax/subsidy = Outputcombined approach two sample, unequal variances  -2.70      (0.074) 
Outputfixed penalty = Outputcombined approach two sample, unequal variances  -0.33      (0.763) 
Note: mean output for the last 10 periods in a session are the units of observation.
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Figure 1. Experiment Supply and Demand Schedules 
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Figure 2. Average Time Series of Experiment Treatments 
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Note: Mechanism imposed in periods 11-30 only.
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Figure 3. Time Series of All Sessions 
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Appendix A. General Experiment Instructions. 
 
Notes:  Bold typeface is used to highlight terms you will encounter during the experiment. There 
are concepts that are likely to be unfamiliar to you. Everything will be explained after you have 
read the instructions and you will be able to ask questions. 
Introduction 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. The experiment has two parts, 
consisting of 10 and 20 trading periods, respectively. In this experiment, you operate one of 
six firms in an industry. Human participants control the five other firms. Your firm and the 
other five firms interact each trading period by competing to sell a product in a market. 
Because of this market interaction, your earnings depend on the behavior of others as well as 
your own behavior. The consumers in this market behave like experienced buyers and are 
represented by the computer. In each period, you have the opportunity to sell up to 5 units of 
your product. You only produce what actually gets sold. The cost of producing each of your 
5 units is $50, $150, $300, $500, and $800, respectively.  In other words, your production 
costs rise as your output increases. You determine the offer price - the price at which you 
are willing to sell your product - for each of these units and type these offers in the offer 
submission web page (shown below). This is the only decision you have to make and your 
goal is to make as much money as possible. In addition to product sales, in each period you 
earn $500 from your other business activities.  
 
For every $2,000 earned in the experiment you will receive $1 in cash. 
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The six firms are located near a common water resource. Some by-products of your firm 
enter the water, affecting water quality. The more you and your competitors produce, the 
higher the level of water pollution. Under average conditions each unit produced by you or 
your competitors results in one unit of pollution.  
 
A variety of factors such as stream flow and the rate of surface runoff affect pollution levels. 
For example, heavy rainfall increases surface runoff, increasing pollution levels. High 
stream flow results in relatively less pollution, as the ability of the waterway to assimilate 
your by-products increases. Unfortunately, factors such as these are unpredictable due to 
complex physical, chemical and biological relationships. Taking into account the uncertainty 
surrounding realized pollution levels, the relationship Pollution = Industry Output + 
random term holds. Industry Output is the sum of all units sold by you and the other firms 
in your market. The random term is equal to zero on average and takes on values between -
1.0 and +1.0. Each number in this range has an equal chance of being selected.   
 
Pollution directly affects the well-being of water resource users. For example, high 
pollution levels affect the health of fish, causing losses to fisherman. Also, poor water 
quality affects swimming and other recreation activities. In general, each unit of pollution 
results in a $500 loss in well-being to others. The pollution level does not affect your profits 
in any way during the first part of the experiment but might in subsequent parts. 
 
Determining Market Price 
The buying and selling of your industry’s product is determined in a single price auction. In 
this auction, the simulated consumers submit bids to buy your product.  These bids are 
ranked from highest to lowest in price. You and your competitors submit offers to sell your 
product. The offers are ranked from lowest to highest in price. In the auction, the cheapest 
offers are accepted in rank-order as long as the bid price is greater than the offer price. The 
market price is the average of the bid price and offer price of the last unit sold.  
 
For example, suppose the offer prices are $4, $6, and $8, and the bid prices are $10, $7, and 
$5. Using the auction, 2 units are sold at a market price of $6.50. The consumer is willing to 
pay $7 for the 2nd unit while the producer is willing to sell this unit at a price of $6.00. A 3rd 
unit is not traded since the consumer is willing to pay $5, but the producer is only willing to 
sell at $8. So, this auction provides a way of making sure that only mutually beneficial trades 
take place. Note that you sell low cost units first. To make this happen in the market, your 
offer price for high cost units must not be less than your offer price for low cost units. 
  
Note:  The market price may be higher than an unaccepted offer price, as a result of how the 
auction works.  In the example above, suppose you submitted an offer price of $6.25. This 
price would be lower than the market price of $6.50, but you would not sell anything. 
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Determining Your Earnings 
 
The goal of this experiment is to choose your offer prices in order to make as much money 
as possible. After you submit offers, the computer determines the market price based on all 
offers submitted by consumers and the six firms in your market. You will then see a results 
page, similar to the one shown below.  
 
The top table presents your revenue, costs, and earnings for each unit sold and displays 
your total earnings for the current period. Your total earnings are calculated as the 
difference between revenue and costs, plus the $500 in income from other sources.  
Revenue is the number of units sold multiplied by the market price. Costs are the total 
production costs for all units sold.   
 
The bottom table presents the results from each trading period you have been through. It also 
displays information on the industry output and pollution for each period. The last two 
rows present your overall experimental earnings and actual earnings (your take home pay).   
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Appendix B. Supplemental Instructions for Tax/Subsidy Treatment with Cheap Talk. 
 
Part 2 of this experiment is identical to Part 1, with one important exception. In order to 
protect the water resource, the regulatory authority believes that the pollution level should be 
at or below 18 units for every trading period. In order to achieve this, the authority 
implements the following policy: If pollution is less than 18 units, you receive a subsidy of 
$500 for each unit of pollution less than 18 units. If pollution is greater than 18 units you 
pay a tax of $500 for each unit of pollution above 18 units. 
 
Pollution is determined by the production from ALL SIX FIRMS in your market. Recall that 
pollution is equal to the total industry output plus a random term that takes on values 
between -1.0 and +1.0. On average, pollution is equal to industry output. NOTE THAT 
WHETHER YOU RECEIVE A SUBSIDY OR PAY A TAX WILL DEPEND NOT ONLY 
ON YOUR OWN OUTPUT (AND HENCE POLLUTION) BUT ON THE OUTPUT 
(POLLUTION) OF ALL THE OTHER FIRMS AS WELL.  
 
In the results table you will see a new row corresponding to the tax or subsidy amount – 
whichever is applicable. As before, information on the pollution and industry output is 
found in the history table.    
 
 
Examples 
 
Suppose that industry output is 20 units and the random term is 0.0. Therefore, pollution 
is 20 units. Since pollution is two units greater than 18, everyone pays a tax of 
2*$500=$1,000. 
 
Suppose that industry output is 17 units and the random term is -1.0. Therefore, pollution 
is 16 units. Since pollution is two units less than 18, everyone receives a subsidy of 
2*$500=$1,000. 
 
 
Group Discussion 
 
Before period 11 begins, the firms in your market will have 5 minutes to informally discuss 
the new policy. The only guidelines for the discussion are that you cannot make any threats 
to the other participants and there are to be no side payments of any kind. 
 
There will be another group discussion later on in the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 

